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Abstract 
 
 
This paper presents the first assessment of the efficiency of the technology transfer operated by the 
French university system and its main determinants. The analysis is based on a detailed and original 
database of 51 TTOs, categorized by type of university they belong to, over the period 2003-2007. 
Overall, we find a low level of efficiency and both intra-category and inter-categories efficiency 
variation. The analysis of determinants showed that French TTOs efficiency depends extensively on 
the nature of the category (with universities specialised in science and engineering being the most 
efficient ones), on institutional and environmental characteristics. We found that both the seniority 
of TTO and size of the university have a positive effect. In terms of environmental variables, the 
intensity of R&D activity (both private and public) has a positive impact; however, in terms of 
growth rate, only the Private R&D activity seems to be the main driver. Lastly, we find that the 
presence of a university-related hospital is detrimental for the efficiency. An extended discussion of 
the results within the existing literature is also offered. 
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1. Introduction  
 The recent undergoing rapid changes in national systems of research and innovation, along 
with changes in economic conditions, are challenging European universities in acting a prominent, 
and more integrated, role within the national economy. This phenomenon is strictly linked to the 
increasing recognition of the importance of universities in producing, transferring and 
commercializing knowledge toward the knowledge-based economies.  In this new context, 
universities are facing an important period of unprecedented change and transition, characterized by 
an increasing number of roles to play while endeavouring to have a more business-oriented 
behaviour focused on competition (Deiaco et al. 2009).  
 It follows a broader picture of complexity where several, and often divergent, interests of 
different stakeholders involved have to be addressed.  In such a framework, successful technology 
transfer requires university administrators to think strategically about how that process might be the 
key of success.  Strategic decisions, for instance, are related to the choice of resources allocation 
among possible modes of technology transfer, namely licensing, start-ups, sponsored research rather 
than other mechanisms of technology transfer that are focused more directly on stimulating 
economic and regional development (such as incubators and science parks, should be based on 
strategic choices). 
 In the last decade, policy makers of advanced industrial nations, Europe included, started to 
formalize the mechanism of university-industry technology transfer through the systematic 
development of Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs).  As today, there is a lot of attention among 
policymakers and academics in understanding the TTO business profile, patterns of behaviours, and 
configuration of activities. This because the success of a TTO in technology transfer can result in 
pecuniary gains for the university and benefits for surrounding communities (Chapple et. al., 2005).  
The most crucial questions in mind of policymakers and academics are related to how productivity 
 3 
and efficient are universities in transferring technology and whether (or not) there exist key factors 
enabling the performance of TTOs. 
 There are several studies on the efficiency of TTOs, estimated from indicators of outputs 
and inputs of university technology transfer (for a recent review see Siegel, 2007). Most of the 
available empirical evidence is based on US data while evidence on European countries is much 
more limited, mostly due to the lack of data. Interestingly, a recent policy paper, summarizing some 
evidence on European universities, suggested that “perhaps the most important conclusion for 
policy making at this stage is to invest more in data and analysis” (Van der Ploeg and Veugelers, 
2008).  A common finding of this stream of literature is that accurate measurement of TTOs 
efficiency requires accounting for the influence of TTO specific characteristics as well as economic 
characteristics where the TTO is located.  However, there remains little empirical evidence on 
European TTOs.  
 This paper attempts to fill this gap by studying university TTOs operating in France. 
Differently from the US and UK TTOs where the technology transfer process is more advanced, the 
French context offers an interesting laboratory to investigate TTOs operating at the first stage of 
their development, maybe closer to the Spanish context. In fact, while TTOs have been established 
very recently, it appears that the majority were established soon after the introduction of the first 
French government action taken in 1999.  This action, the July 1999 Innovation Law, constitutes the 
main policy decision taken to favour technology transfer processes between universities and 
industry.  Since its introduction, the number of TTOs increased but the need to accelerate and 
improve the quality of technology transfer process led to the introduction of other laws.  For 
instance, a law for public accounting was adopted in 2001 to introduce a ‘new public-management 
oriented’ reform. This reform defines for all public interventions (including research and higher 
education) a set of objectives, along with corresponding sets of indicators patent-based to mirror 
technology transfer activities of French university. Given this context, it becomes important to 
assess the efficiency of French technology transfer activities at this stage to deeply understand how 
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they are fulfilling their role in the early stage of development and possibly derive policy 
implications both for their future growth and also for new entering TTOs.  If on the one hand, 
studying the technology process of French TTOs is interesting because allows to draw a picture on 
the functioning of a “young” system, on the other hand, it makes difficult to track the whole process 
(all possible technology transfer activities) for all the TTOs under investigation.  We therefore 
model the process under an operational efficiency perspective, measuring how good are French 
TTOs in maximising the production of patent applications and other patent-related outputs, given 
the level of resources (inputs) used.  
 In this paper, we first compute the efficiency of individual TTOs and after that we examine 
the main determinants of individual TTO efficiency scores using the two-stage DEA approach 
proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007). According to this approach, individual TTO efficiency 
scores are regressed on some specific TTO characteristics as well as the regional economic 
conditions and R&D activity.  
 Summing up, this paper extends the current performance TTO literature along several 
dimensions: (i) it analyzes TTOs in their early stage of development, (ii) it provides the first 
quantitative assessment of French TTOs efficiency based on an original and detailed dataset, 
enriching the European empirical evidence on technology transfer, (iii) it applies a recently 
developed statistical approach based on Data Envelopment Analysis and bootstrapping techniques 
(Simar and Wilson, 2007); (iv) lastly, it discusses policy implications of the results compared with 
existing studies on other countries. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature overview 
on TTOs efficiency; Section 3 examines the French context and our modeling of the activities of 
French TTOs; Section 4 describes the methodology applied; Section 5 illustrates the data and 
formulates the production models. Section 6 is devoted to the investigations on the TTOs (in-
)efficiency determinants. Section 7 reports the empirical findings. In the framework of the recent 
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institutional policies, the final section discusses the main results comparing them with the existing 
literature and outlines further developments 
2. A selected review of the literature  
Since the pioneering contributions of Thursby and Thursby (2002) and Thursby and Kemp 
(2002), the assessment (and explanation) of TTOs performance has remained the main issue of 
debate among academics and policymakers.  If on the one hand it is increasingly attracting the 
attention of policymakers, as documented by the large amount of policy initiatives in this field (e.g., 
European Commission 2004, 2008), on the other hand this issue is not well documented in the 
literature, in particular for the European case.   
Our analysis on French TTOs is in the same spirit as those empirical studies of the performance 
of TTOs with respect to licensing and patenting activities (for a more general overview, see Siegel, 
2007).  Overall, we selected a total of six papers, of which four deal with the US (i.e. Thursby and 
Thursby, 2002; Thursby and Kemp, 2002; Siegel et al., 2003; Anderson et al., 2007), one with the 
UK (Chapple et al., 2005), one with Spain (Caldera and Debande, 2010) and one based on a cross-
country comparison US vs. UK TTOs (Siegel et al., 2008).  This strand of literature focuses on the 
performance measurement with two crucial policy-related questions in mind: the first is “Should 
TTOs improve their ability to operate by adjusting their production mix?”, the second “Which are 
the key factors enabling TTOs to operate more efficiently? Are they related to either specific TTO 
characteristics and/or to certain types of TTOs? And/or to the intensity of direct and indirect 
connections the TTO might establish with region where they are located?”.  Empirical evidence 
supports the second argument showing that factors, unrelated to the production plan, do matter for 
the effectiveness of TTOs.  However, the direction of the influence of these factors (positive or 
negative) remains unclear, due in part to the use of different approaches (parametric vs. non-
parametric approach) and/or to different TTOs activities analyzed (single output vs. multi-output).  
It should be noted that very often researchers are limited to analyze partial TTO production process 
 6 
as TTOs are far from covering all the activities (early stage of development) or data availability is 
fragmented (e.g., Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2007) or data may be heterogeneous (see Daraio et al., 
2011).  Overall, these issues rule out the possibility to achieve a general consensus. 
 Looking at the construction of output distance function, several approaches have been used.  
For instance, the works by Thursby and Kemp (2002) and Anderson et al. (2007) is based on DEA 
approach, allowing for the multi-outputs structure.  Outputs are measured both in terms of physical 
and monetary values such as the number of licences executed, the number of invention disclosures, 
the number of patent applications and the amount of industry sponsored research and royalties 
received.  On the contrary, Siegel et al. (2003) and Chapple et al. (2005) employ the stochastic 
frontier estimation approach restricting the production process to one single-output structure.  They 
obviate the failure to capture the dual strategy of license numbers and license income maximization 
by estimating two frontiers, using one output at a time.  Siegel et al. (2008) extend the previous 
works by constructing a multiple-output distance function from a parametric approach, including 
number of licenses, licensing income, as well as the new university startups generated and equity 
banked new university startups.  By using a simple linear regression analysis, rather than frontier 
approach, Caldera and Debande (2010) estimate several specification models where the output of 
TTOs are measures  in terms of income (from R&D contracts, licensing), number of R&D 
contracts, licensing agreements and the number of spin-offs.  Overall, these papers investigate the 
TTOs efficiency accounting for both physical and monetary outputs. While efficiency related to the 
former is closer to the concept of technical-efficiency, the second is closer to profit-efficiency.  It 
should be borne in mind that, depending on the approach taken, the determination of factors 
affecting the efficiency might change, as is also shown in the empirical evidence.  
 The two sets of variables under investigation are: (i) specific TTO features and specific 
group features, (ii) regional macroeconomic features.  Regarding the specific TTOs characteristics, 
several dimensions have been tested. First, the presence of a medical school.  It is generally 
assumed that universities with medical schools are likely to be more efficient than those without 
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because it is easier for them to conduct clinical trials and produce a large fraction of university 
licenses related to biomedical inventions.  However, empirical evidence is controversial.  Some 
papers show that the presence of medical school dampens the efficiency of US (e.g., Thursby and 
Kemp, 2002; Anderson et al., 2007) as well as of UK TTOs when their strategy is license income 
maximization (Chapple et al., 2005).  This efficiency reduction may be related to the heavy services 
commitments of medical school or to differences in the health product market.  On the other hand, 
other studies do not show any statistically significant impact on the efficiency, such as is the case of 
Spanish TTOs and US TTOs under both output assumptions (Siegel et al., 2003).  However, the 
analysis proposed by Siegel et al. (2008) shows that universities with medical schools are more 
efficient.  These controversial differences in results might be due to different production process 
characterization. 
 Second, the experience of TTOs in channelling technology. It is assumed to be directly 
proportional to the age of the TTO and pivotal to possibly benefit from “learning by doing” effects. 
However, this factor plays a dual role, depending on the strategies pursued by the TTO’s 
management, as also pointed out by empirical results.  For the US TTOs, Siegel et al. (2003) show 
that older TTOs are more efficient when the income maximization strategy is employed.  However, 
Siegel et al. (2008) find opposite results.  These controversial results might be explained by the 
differences in the number of outputs used in the estimation.  By constructing a frontier based on a 
larger set of outputs, the latter paper unveils that older TTOs are more likely to be interested in 
alternative strategies of technology transfer.  Any statistically significant influence of age on US 
TTOs is found under the number of licences maximization.  The analysis of UK TTOs shows, on 
the other hand, that age has a negative effect on efficiency but only when the objective is the 
maximization of the number of licenses, possibly reflecting diseconomies of scales or efforts to 
employ strategies different from licensing. For the case of Spanish TTOs no statistically significant 
impact is found (Caldera and Debande, 2010). 
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 Third, the TTO ownership.  Some papers distinguish between private vs public universities 
as public universities might be less flexible in technology transfer process in the interaction with 
firms and also less focused on the technology research at high income potential (Siegel et al., 2003).  
Caldera and Debande (2010) support this hypothesis as they find public ownership to have a 
negative effect on licensing for the Spanish case due to the fact that public universities in Spain do 
not have close links to the private sector.   
 The second group of variables under scrutiny is a set of regional macroeconomic 
characteristics and regional R&D intensity.  It is generally assumed that the integration of a TTO 
with the local area enhances efficiency.  For this set, empirical evidence provides a more general 
consensus.  In particular, TTOs in regions with higher R&D activity are found to be more efficient 
in generating new licences and/or other forms of outputs, with the exception of income, for the case 
of the UK and the US. TTOs (Chapple et al., 2005; Siegel et al., 2003; Siegel et al., 2008).  
Moreover, the regional development measured by the regional GDP per capita or annual real output 
growth  is found to have a positive effect on the UK TTOs in generating licence income and for 
both the UK and the US (Siegel et al., 2003, Siegel et al., 2008) in also generating new licences 
jointly with other strategies. 
 The Table 1 below summarizes the main results of the selected studies from the literature 
that were relevant for our empirical analysis. We will consider the existing empirical evidence in 
the Empirical Results Section where we will discuss the main findings of our analysis. 
 
[TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] 
 
Our paper contributes to the literature summarized in the previous table in three directions.  
First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that examines the French university 
system. Secondly, we use a recently developed methodology to investigate the determinants of the 
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heterogeneity in performance across TTOs. Thirdly, we discuss our results in relation with existing 
studies on other countries and discuss the policy implications. 
3.  Modeling the activity of French TTOs 
3.1 The French public research and higher education system: State and evolution 
 Over the last two decades, the French research and higher education system has undergone 
structural changes which led to the progressive disappearance of the dominant role of the Colbertian 
State (Mustar and Larédo, 2002). In fact, the French system was based on a very specific 
interventionist model, characterized by four main features, which emphasised the dominant weight 
of large civil and defence programmes, the division between universities and the French national 
research council (CNRS), the congenital separation between research and firms and finally the 
concentration of public support on a few large companies. This model has been undergoing 
fundamental changes since the 80s, giving way to a more complex system, where a relative 
reduction of the resources devoted to public research, the increase of the institutional complexity 
and the need to serve a “third mission” of contributing to local economic development (Etzkowitz, 
2002) are the main challenges that need urgently to be faced.  
 The French research and higher education system is largely public. It includes all 
universities, most of the Higher Education Institutions -HEIs - (except some business schools), and 
the large research organizations (PROs).  Moreover, a high share of research-related resources of 
HEIs and PROs also comes from public sources compared to other possible sources (contracts with 
firms or not-for-profit organisations, donations, Intellectual Property Rights -IPR- incomes, etc), 
most teachers-researchers and a very high share of researchers in universities and PROs are civil 
servants.  
 The French research and higher education system is composed by: 88 universities active in higher 
education teaching and, at different level, in research activities; several dozens of HEIs, including 
most “Grandes Ecoles” in engineering and public administration; and around 25 PROs, some 
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mainly oriented towards fundamental research, (such as CNRS, INSERM, INRA and so on), others 
mainly oriented towards applied research and commercialization (such as CEA, CNES, ADEME 
and so on)1. We will concentrate our analysis on the main universities under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Education, Higher Education and Research (MENESR)2, excluding the PROs.  The 
selected group shows high level of hetereogeneity, also given by size and discipline coverage3. 
 A key aspect of the research and higher education system is its “duality”, in which large PROs 
stand beside universities4.  Although the separation tends to be increasingly blurred, this breakdown 
still has a very strong influence on research activities, governance, allocation of resources, and so 
on. Indeed, 44% of the approximatively 3,000 university research units (including all the top ones) 
are “joint research units” between PROs organized at national level (especially CNRS and 
INSERM) and individual universities organized at local level (those "joint research units" 
sometimes involve more than one university and more than one PRO). A joint research unit, 
according to local agreements, can follow the procedures and the organisational setting of one of the 
institutions5 supervising the research unit. Of course, this “duality” induces some constraints and 
structural bias on the data collection and on the database used in the analysis6. This specificity of 
the French HEI system may have an influence on the technology transfer activities and therefore 
should be taken into account. 
The French government developed an explicit policy to deal with the supposed weakness and 
difficulties of the research system. It did implement new policy tools and reforms, most of them 
aiming to promote public research-industry interactions. The July 1999 Innovation Law was the 
main decision taken to promote the creation of innovative technology companies and the 
                                                 
1
 But the creation in 2005/06 of two agencies (ANR – National Agency for Research, and AII – Agency for Industrial 
Innovation, more on the industrial research side) may tend to re-centralize a large share of the funding role of more 
classic agencies, at least with regard to project-based funding. 
2
 In addition, on the upstream end of the research spectrum there are very few big foundations, which mainly are in 
medicine (such as Institut Curie and Institut Pasteur). At the downstream end of the research spectrum a large number 
of Technical Centres (sector oriented) and Technologies Resources Centres (often regionally based) co-exist. 
3
 We will control for them in our second stage analysis. 
4
 Another duality resides on the HE side, where universities stand beside the so-called Grandes Ecoles. 
5
 Even if various common rules and procedures, forms of coordination and mutualization processes have recently been 
fostered. 
6
 For a deeper discussion on this issue, see Bach and Llerena (2007). 
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technology transfer of public research towards industry.  The Innovation Law imposes to all 
universities to develop an explicit policy for ‘commercialising’ their results. Later, the frame was 
adjusted to allow for the creation of ‘Services d’Activités Industrielles et Commerciales: SAIC’ 
(“Department for industrial and commercial activities”), in other words of Technology Transfer 
Offices (TTOs).  In this context, some of the private accounting rules were introduced for 
technology transfer activities, although TTOs are not independent legal entities.   
For the academic researcher, the Innovation Law implements an incentive system to become 
more entrepreneurial and, vice versa, for the existing firms to increase their scientific expertise. In 
particular, it was intended to encourage: (i) the creation of new firms; (ii) an increase in the number 
of technological innovation and research networks; (iii) financial and legal reforms to benefit 
innovative companies.  The main purpose of our paper is to assess the relative efficiency of the 
TTOs, many of them established after 1999. 
In addition, and in parallel, in 2001 a law for Public Accounting (Loi Organique sur la Loi de 
Finance, LOLF hereafter) was adopted. This new reform, called New Public Management oriented 
Reform, affects all state expenditure, in a framework of re-organization of public intervention into 
broad missions, broken down into programs, and finally into actions. A set of objectives, with 
corresponding sets of indicators are assigned to all public expenditure. University and PRO 
activities are aligned with the mission "Research and Higher Education".  To monitor science-
industry relations, the indicators used for university research activities that refer to technology 
transfer activities are mainly based on patents (Assemblée Nationale, 2005).  
 Therefore, the pressure for developing technology transfer indicators and corresponding 
statistics came directly from govermental authorities in order to monitor the efficiency of public 
spending, in particular in the science and techonology field. As a matter of fact, at least during the 
period under consideration in our paper (2003-2007) the main indicators of technology transfer 
were based on patent applications in a broad sense, including extensions, and similar IPR 
instruments for software. For this reason, in the empirical setting of our analysis we use as proxy of 
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the outputs the patent related measures. Of course, we are aware that our choice has its own 
limitations, as pointed out by Bach and Llerena (2007, p. 5): “especially since institutionalization of 
Technology Transfer (TT) is quite recent in most of the French universities, TTOs are far from 
covering all TT-related activities. It is even doubtful whether there is in each HEI or PRO a 
systematic and coherent information system allowing the recording of TT activities in a 
comprehensive way. This makes it difficult to get a precise estimate of the relative importance of the 
"hidden" TT activities, especially of course those conducted on a  purely individual (and frequently 
"off-duty") basis by researchers.”  Nevertheless, our paper provides the first assessment of the (in-
)efficiency levels of the TTOs in France, following the explicit policy to develop patent related 
indicators in the early 2000s. Moreover it investigates the determinants of inefficiency differentials 
and contributes to filling the gap existing in the literature, related to the lack of empirical evidence 
on the French system of university TTOs. 
3.2 Defining TTOs’ activities to assess their efficiency 
 The Technology Transfer Office (TTO) has a specific organizational arrangement designed 
to encourage the University-Industry Technology Transfer (UITT) process and commercialization.  
Our purpose in this paper is to analyze the relative efficiency of French TTOs, especially after the 
reforms described in the previous section, without devising our own output measures but using 
metrics proposed by the law. 
 TTOs are considered as structures having their own production process, transforming the 
general knowledge produced by researchers (and research units of a given research institution such 
as universities) into transferable knowledge, to be used by firms.  According to the French 
legislator, the main products of the process are patent related outputs, including in particular patent 
applications. Indeed, as also Thursby and Thursby (2002) pointed out, in the evaluation of TTOs 
processes one should take care of the bias due to the delays between the inputs used to produce 
issued patents and avoid it by using patent applications.  Therefore we use patent applications and 
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their extensions as our proxy for French TTOs. As already explained in the previous section, these 
metrics were used by the Ministry in charge of research to monitor the TTOs’ activity during our 
period of observation. 
 In our model, the TT process of a TTO (see Figure 1) uses mainly two types of inputs: the 
first one is related to the means at the disposal of TTOs to operate and transform general knowledge 
into codified knowledge, i.e. into patent applications. It is mainly composed of their own personnel 
and some external advice (mostly legal). But the main input is the knowledge produced by the 
university, most of the time integrating novelties which are considered as some kind of “raw” 
materials, usually at an early stage of development. We propose to use scientific publications as a 
proxy for this input.  
 Of course, as any production process, the outcomes are context dependent; we will consider 
explicitly two types of context: the external one – i.e. the regional economic characteristics and the 
internal one – i.e. the university characteristics, because each university has its own specificities, 
mainly related to the disciplines covered, influencing the production opportunities (possibilities) of 
its TTO. 
 
[FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE] 
4. The methodology: A two stage semi-parametric bootstrap based approach 
We examine the determinants of (in-) efficiency by using a two-stage DEA estimation based on 
the bootstrap procedure proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007), wherein technical (in-)efficiency is 
estimated in the first stage and then regressed on a set of external (environmental) factors in the 
second stage.  Beside the major advantages related to DEA estimation, that is the lack of any 
assumption on the functional form of the production frontier and the simultaneous use of multiple 
inputs and outputs, the bootstrap procedure overcomes some of the main issues related to the 
traditional two-stage DEA analysis (also acknowledged by Chapple et al., 2005) by allowing for (i) 
the bias correction incorporated in DEA due to the uncertainty associated to sampling variation, 
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particularly evident in the case of small sample sizes, as in our analysis (ii) accounting for the serial 
correlation structure of DEA efficiency scores when the regression of these scores is estimated on 
the environmental variables at the second stage. 
We assume that TTOs share the same production frontier, which respects standard regularity 
conditions. Let each TTO activity be described by a set of inputs (resources) Hkx +ℜ∈  which are 
converted into a set of outputs Mky +ℜ∈  via an underlying production technology. It can be 
characterized by the technology set, defined as: 
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Since the real technology is unknown, its estimation is required. Thus, at the first stage, we first 
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where 0≥kz  are the intensity variables over which the maximization is made. The 
estimation of the technology frontier makes efficiency measurements possible. Various measures of 
efficiency are possible. We use the Debreu (1951)-Farrell (1957) measure of (in-)efficiency as 
radial distances to the estimated frontier. In the paper we adopt an output oriented framework: given 
the level of resources (inputs) used by university TTOs, they look at the maximization of their 
outputs. Then the Farrell output oriented measure of technical (in-)efficiency score is given by: 
{ }DEAyxyx Ψ∈= ˆ),(max),(ˆ λλλ      (3) 
In this approach, a TTO is considered efficient if it lies on the “efficient” estimated frontier, i.e. if 
1),(ˆ =kk yxλ , otherwise it is inefficient and 1),(ˆ fkk yxλ . ),(ˆ kk yxλ  measures the proportional 
{ }yproducecanxyx MH ++ ℜ×ℜ∈=Ψ ),(
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increase of outputs that a TTO could realize using the same level of inputs it is actually using. The 
main limitations of DEA are its deterministic nature (all the distances from the efficient frontier are 
assumed to be inefficiency) and its biased estimation. Hence we control for the uncertainty of DEA 
scores estimating their bias and confidence intervals by using a consistent bootstrap approximation 
of the efficiency distribution (see for more details Simar and Wilson, 2000). 
 At the second stage, we analyze the dependency of the efficiency specific to each TTO on a 
set of environmental factors, kZ . We follow Simar and Wilson (2007) by applying: (i) a truncated 
regression to consistently estimate the parameters by using maximum likelihood and (ii) a 
consistent bootstrap for inference in the case of truncated regression.  The bias corrected efficiency 
scores, resulting from the first stage, enter the regression as dependent variable in the second stage. 
As efficiency scores are bounded at unity, the distribution of the error term is restricted. Formally, 
the model is defined as follows: 
   NkZ kk
c
k ,,1ˆ K=∀+≈ εβλ                                                   )4(  
where ),0(~ 2εσε Nk  such that NkZ kk ,,1,1 K=∀−≥ βε , being the dependent variables 
bounded by unity.  The estimation procedure and the bootstrap algorithms are described in more 
details in Simar and Wilson (2007). 
5. Data and production models 
5.1 Selected Inputs and Outputs  
 Data from French TTOs were collected by BETA (Bureau d’Economie Théorique et 
Appliquée, UMR UdS-CNRS 7522, Strasbourg) in 2005, 2007 and 20097, during regular surveys, 
funded by the French Ministry in charge of Higher Education and Research. The surveys had the 
support of the national French TTO network (CURIE), CPU (the Conference of University Rectors) 
and CDEFI (Association of Engineering Schools Directors).  The purpose of the surveys was to 
build a first comprehensive database, focused on variables characterising different dimensions of 
                                                 
7
 See Bach and Llerena ( 2006, 2008, 2010). 
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technology transfer by Higher Education Institutions such as Universities and Engineering Schools 
(generically called “universities” thereafter).  A first questionnaire was elaborated in 2004 and e-
mailed to 74 universities.  In 2007, a more detailed version was submitted to a larger number of 
universities (96 universities).  More recently, the survey was launched on line, allowing for further 
refinements of the questions and a more efficient process of data collection.  
 The description of the UITT process, reported in Section 3.2 helped us identify the 
appropriate set of inputs and outputs to be included in the production function.  For French TTOs 
the most critical outputs (we call “core outputs”) are patent applications (PAT_APP) and software 
applications (SW_APP).  However, French TTOs are also active in releasing patents extensions. 
Therefore, we include both number of patents with submitted extension requests (PAT_EXT) and 
number of extensions required (Nb_PAT_EXT) as additional outputs and call them “patent-related 
outputs”.  As input measures, we choose labour, measured by the number of full time equivalent 
employees in the TTO (ETP) and the number of publications (expressed in fractional terms) 
(PUB)8.  The number of publications is used as a proxy of the stock of knowledge available to the 
TTO.  
 In France, the UITT process is still very slow and time lags might occur between the inputs 
used and the outputs produced, causing a mismatch in the production process. For instance, inputs 
used today will produce outputs in the coming years.  In order to prevent any error from time lags, 
we base our analysis on 5-year (from 2003 to 2007) averages of the data, as in previous studies 
(e.g., Thursby and Kemp, 2002; Anderson et al., 2007).  Although several universities reported 
numerous zeros, we end up with a database comprehensive enough to carry out an efficiency 
assessment: 51 TTOs, covering all the categories of disciplinary fields of the related university: (i) 
Polyvalent University with Medical School (UPAM), (ii) Polyvalent University without Medical 
School (UPSM), (iii) Polytechnics (INP), (iv) Science Universities (USC), (v) Social Science and 
Humanities Universities, Law and Economics (USH/D-E), (vi) Engineering School (ING).  
                                                 
8
 Elaborated by OST using Web of Science.  
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Table 2 presents the summary statistics of input and output variables for the pooled sample 
according to the categories of disciplinary field of the related university.  The statistics suggest 
heterogeneity across groups in terms of their input and output compositions, justifying our 
discussion of the results according to this breakdown.  Heterogeneity is also found within each 
group, as the high value of standard deviation shows. This reflects the fact that TTOs have some 
specific characteristics, unrelated to the group of belonging. 
Not surprisingly, USC universities employ, on average, the largest amount of ETP and have 
the largest amount of technology stock.  They seem to be very far from using similar amount of 
inputs used by other universities.  ING and UPAM universities are more similar, in particular in the 
availability of amount of technology stock, while UPSM and USHS/D-E have a TTO staff similar, 
on average, to the staff of UPSM, though they differ in the amount of technology stock.  
USC universities have, on average, the largest patent application activity as well as the largest 
amount in the remaining activities.  ING and UPAM, on average, seem to have similar patent 
application production but different productions in the remaining activities.  Although USHS\D-E, 
in principle, might be less involved in technology transfer, they exhibit modest outputs in all the 
activities and outperform UPSM in software applications. If we look at the variability in output 
production within each group, evidence of it is found, in particular across USC TTOs.  
These considerations lead us to expect evidence of quite substantial inefficiency, which 
might stem simply from other factors (such as university category, intrinsic characteristics of TTOs, 
and regional influences) rather than those related to competencies in technology transferring. We, 
therefore, support the hypothesis that there may be different ways to approach the technical efficient 
frontier. 
[TABLE 2AROUND HERE] 
Lastly, from Table 2, it should be possible to deduce the importance of accounting for both the 
core (patent and software applications) and the patent-related outputs (extended output portfolio 
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with the number of patents whose extension is submitted and the number of extensions), as the 
volume of the latter could not be disregarded.  
 
[TABLE 3 AROUND HERE] 
 
However, by inspecting Table 3, we find high levels of correlation (higher than 87%) between 
PAT_APP and both PAT_EXT and Nb_PAT_EXT. We therefore model the production process 
according to two inputs-outputs configurations: one wherein we select as outputs patent and 
software applications (Model 1) and another one wherein patents whose extension is submitted and 
extensions of patents are also included. Model 2 aims to capture the entire dimension of technology 
transfer whereas Model 1 captures only the core activities. The interpretation from a statistical point 
of view, however, is that the two models are likely to produce similar estimates due to the 
correlation among variables. However Model 2 is more likely to suffer from the curse of 
dimensionality, being estimated on a higher dimensional space (more inputs and outputs), implying 
a lost in the level of statistical precision as well as lower discriminatory power among DEA 
estimates. Therefore, to better disentangle the simultaneous effects of different exogenous variables 
on DEA estimates, we restrict the second stage to the analysis of Model 1.  
5.2 Factors affecting the TTOs’ (in-)efficiency  
 In this section we describe candidate determinants of (in-)efficiency.  The first set is related 
to possible source of heterogeneity of TTOs (Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2007; Daraio et al., 2011) 
related to university specificities, including disciplinary mix.  The second set is related to the 
macro-economic level of regions where TTOs are located as well as the interaction between TTOs 
and R&D activity of the region where the TTOs are located.  Also in this case, we assume that they 
play an important role in the French context due to possible agglomeration effects and economic 
disparities across French regions. We analyse them in turn. 
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Specific and group-specific TTO characteristics 
 Four dimensions of heterogeneity are controlled for, namely TTO age, university size, 
presence of a university-related hospital, and disciplinary field.  Contrary to other studies, we do not 
control for the ownership (private vs. public) as French TTOs are related to public universities. 
Age (AGE).  We use this variable, measured as the length of time that has passed since the creation 
of technology transfer, to account for possible “learning by doing” effects in the production of 
technology. It might occur that some older TTOs benefit from their experience compared to the 
younger TTOs.  We expect a positive impact on TTOs efficiency.  In fact, since their creation, 
TTOs focus their strategies of technology transfer in engaging the “best” inventions to be 
transformed into patents, and source of income afterwards.  
Number of Professors (SIZE).  This is used to proxy the size of the university related to the TTO as 
larger universities are expected to produce more research, and therefore, to be more prone to 
disclose their inventions. For instance, Caldera and Debande (2010) find that the number of 
professors working at the university has a significant positive impact on TTO efficiency (when the 
output is measured in terms of R&D contract income and number of contracts).  
University-related hospital (HOSPITAL).  In France, there are USC universities with both medical 
schools and university-related hospital while UPAM universities may have only the medical school.  
It is therefore more informative for the French case to control for the presence of a university-
related hospital (dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a university-related hospital, 0 otherwise).  
The presence of a university-related hospital guarantees significant ongoing medical research, 
whereas a simple medical school reveals only a training activity. It is usually thought that medical 
research is an important source of technology transfer. However, it might happen that both 
institutions, the university and the university-related hospital, that are legally independent entities, 
try and capture the potential technology transfer coming from life and medical sciences. For this 
reason the impact of the presence of university-related hospital is uncertain and it depends on the 
competition between the two institutions (namely the university and the university-related hospital). 
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In the literature in fact results are controversial and also for the French case the impact of this 
variable is uncertain.  
University disciplinary category dummy variable.  Lastly, we control for group-specific features 
associated to each university disciplinary category (ING, UPAM, UPSM, USC, and USHS).  We 
use a total of 5 dummy variables to capture any possible effects.  This helps us investigate whether 
the inefficiency of some TTOs associated to less innovation-oriented disciplinary fields (such as 
USHS) is driven by an inefficient production plan of the TTOs or whether it is driven merely by 
intrinsic aspects of the group.  In line with the literature, we expect that the scope of disciplines 
does matter.  
[TABLE 4 AROUND HERE] 
Table 4 shows a descriptive analysis of the variables AGE, SIZE and HOSPITAL. 
By inspecting Table 4, it appears that science universities (USC) are the most experienced (mean: 
15,215 years). The average is well beyond the time passed since 1999 when the ‘Innovation law’ 
was established to make the existence of an explicit technology transfer policy at the university 
level compulsory. It is also the case for the category ING (engineering schools) and UPAM (i.e. 
universities with medical schools). Concerning the size of university, we can see that there exists 
higher level of homogeneity across TTOs.  The presence of the hospital, on the contrary, is a 
specific characteristic associated to UPAM and USC universities. 
 
Regional macro-economic characteristics and regional R&D intensity  
Although we are studying TTOs operating in the same nation, regional economic development is 
likely to differ substantially.  France is not an exception as it is characterized by high differentials in 
territorial dynamics and regional policies for research and innovation (OST, 2010). Overall these 
differences might differently affect the way TTOs operate.   
 We control for that by using a set of variables, including both the economic macro-economic 
characteristics and the R&D intensity of the region where the TTO is located.  In the line with the 
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approaches used in the literature, we use GDP per capita as index of regional development.  
However, contrary to other studies, we split regional intensity in R&D into public and private R&D 
intensity in order to distinguish between inside pushing dynamics (public expenditure) and outside 
pulling one (private R&D).  In particular, we measure the public (and private) R&D intensity as the 
public (and private) R&D expenditure per capita.  We expect outside pulling as a driver of 
efficiency.   
 Since we analyze the average-efficiency of TTOs over the period 2003-2007, we also 
control for possible effects due to the rate of growth both of the GDP per capita and the R&D 
intensity, expressed as changes over the entire period.  Specifically, they are: Growth Regional 
GDP intensity which is the growth rate of GDP per capita; Growth Public R&D intensity which is 
the growth rate of public investment in R&D; Growth Private R&D intensity is, finally, the growth 
rate of private investment in R&D. 
 
6. Empirical Results 
[TABLE 7 AROUND HERE] 
 We first present the estimates (biased and bias-corrected respectively) and confidence 
intervals for the DEA Model 1 and Model 2.  The results from the first stage provide insights into 
whether (or not) disciplinary areas and intrinsic characteristics are valid candidates to explain 
efficiency differences among French TTOs.  Results from the second-stage regression provide 
estimates of the effects of individual specific, group-specific and macroeconomic characteristics. 
 As the aim of the analysis is to explain the inefficiency, efficiency scores are reported à la 
Farrell (1957): the closer the score to unity, the more efficient the TTOs.  However, in the 
discussion we also report between brackets the efficiency score à la Shepard (1970), which are the 
reciprocal of the Farrell efficiency scores and represent the relative %-level of efficiency, to easily 
compare our results to previous studies. Preliminary tests on the type of returns to scale exhibited 
globally by the technology have been carried out.   
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Preliminary consideration: testing the returns to scale of the frontier 
 Before starting the DEA frontier estimation, one might wonder which returns to scale are 
exhibited by the technological frontier: either constant (CRS) or variable (VRS).  Previous studies 
on the performance of TTOs (e.g., Siegel et al., 2003 Chapple et al., 2005, Siegel et al., 2008) 
investigated the presence of returns to scale at local level with the aim of finding whether an 
increase or reduction of the scale could improve the efficiency of the unit.  They showed that TTOs 
are more likely to work at constant or decreasing returns to scale.  However, this approach per se 
does not define the type of returns to scale of the frontier (technology). Thus, departing from the 
past analysis, we investigate the type of returns to scale which characterizes the whole technology, 
shared by French TTOs and defined by the best performers. We formally test whether the frontier 
globally exerts constant (CRS), non increase (NIRS) or variable (VRS) returns to scale in a Monte 
Carlo scenario (for more details see Simar and Wilson, 2002).  The test results lead us to reject the 
null hypothesis of global CRS at 5% level for both models (p-values equal to 0.0440 for Model 1 
and p-value equal to 0.0405 for Model 2), accepting global VRS for French TTOs.  This implies 
that our estimation accounts for size-effects related to TTOs. 
First stage regression results: Group-efficiency and specific TTO efficiency results 
 We report the geometric average of the (bias-corrected) efficiency by categories of TTOs 
and of the whole sample, along with the individual TTO efficiency scores (see Tables 5 and 6). The 
first and the second columns report, respectively, the biased efficiency (Eff.) and the bias-corrected 
efficiency (BC-Eff.). The third and fourth columns report the bias term (Est. Bias) and the estimated 
standard deviation (Est-Std.). The final two columns provide the lower bound (LB) and upper 
bound (UB) of the 95% confidence interval of the bias-corrected efficiency scores. The estimated 
bias is negative for all the TTOs efficiency scores, suggesting that our original efficiency is 
overestimated, and the standard deviation indicates that the estimated bias is statistically different 
from zero in nearly all cases. Given that, we discuss the results in terms of bias-corrected efficiency 
and the relative confidence intervals to control for uncertainty. 
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[TABLE 5 AROUND HERE] 
[TABLE 6AROUND HERE] 
 A key factor shown in Tables 5 and 6 is that in both models there is substantial inefficiency 
present in our sample. Considering the model based on core outputs (Model 1), the interpretation is 
that the average Farrell TTOs operate at 2.202 (49.5%) efficiency. In other terms, given the inputs, 
French TTOs could increase their outputs of the double. Considering the model based on both core 
and related outputs simultaneously (Model 2), similar results are found but, in this case, the French 
TTOs operate at slightly higher efficiency, which is 1.961 (or 51%).  This might be attributed to the 
fact that Model 2 captures all TTOs activities, accounting therefore for different strategies pursued.  
Compared to findings in previous papers, our results are partially consistent. In fact, they are in line 
with UK findings (Chapple et al., 2005), which were based on a single output (either number of 
licenses or licensing income). However, they differ from results based on joint analysis of US and 
UK TTOs (Siegel et al., 2008), where the average efficiency is set at 70.7% and the results on US 
TTOs (Thursby and Kemp, 2002), based on a multi-output model, where the average efficiency is 
set at 82%. Of course, the comparison with previous studies has to be taken with care because 
different methods are applied to estimate the efficiency. 
 However, taken together, our results clearly highlight that the French system suffers from 
inefficiency.  This finding leads us to suspect that the entire inefficiency might not be entirely 
attributed to the inability of French TTOs in the technology transfer function (as also found for US 
and Spain TTOs in previous papers), but rather be due to some intrinsic features of TTOs 
(heterogeneity between groups of TTOs and within TTOs groups) as shown in Section 5, possible 
statistical noise, etc. Therefore, the low level of the overall performance should not be interpreted as 
a standing alone result but requires more careful investigation and a joint interpretation with more 
detailed efficiency estimations. To this purpose, we look at first at point group- and individual-
estimates, and then turn to confidence intervals.  
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 In general, we find that there are two groups performing better than others and at a higher 
degree of efficiency than the overall sector.  Comparing the categories of TTOs, in Model 1, the 
results show that science university (USC) TTOs are the most efficient group, followed by 
Engineering School (ING) TTOs and Polyvalent university with medical school (UPAM) TTOs.  
On the contrary, the typical Polyvalent university without medical school (UPSM) TTO and the 
Social and Human Science University, Law and Economics (USHS/D-E) TTO rank at the bottom.  
We conjecture that these results could reflect the fact that USC and ING TTOs have structures, 
processes and strategies focused on processing more applied knowledge rather than a purely 
theoretical knowledge, and with better market opportunities, as opposed to TTOs affiliated to 
UPSM and USHS/DE.  Under Model 2, the ranking is slightly different: Engineering School (ING) 
TTOs are the most efficient, followed by the science university (USC) TTOs and the Polyvalent 
university with medical school (UPAM) TTO. Also, at the bottom of the ranking, we see that, 
unlike in Model 1, Social and Human Science University, Law and Economics (USHS/D-E) TTOs 
perform better than Polyvalent university without medical school (UPSM) TTOs.   
 Further, the standard deviation of the group efficiency seems not to be negligible, as is also 
confirmed by the boxplots depicted in Figure 2.  We therefore turn to investigate intra-group 
efficiency to possibly find internal variations.  In Model 1, UPAM TTOs efficiency scores vary 
from 1.249 to 4.677 while USC TTOs efficiency scores vary from 1.271 to 4.645 if bias-corrected.  
Higher levels of variability are found for the remaining groups, ING, USHS/D-E and UPSM in 
order.  In Model 2, the variation is still present and has similar degree as in Model 1 for most of the 
categories, expect for UPAM and USHS/D-E which seem to perform better.  In addition, the 
efficiency heterogeneity structure associated to each group is similar across groups, as shown by the 
similar efficiency score of TTOs belonging to different groups, except for USHS/D-E.  Taken 
together, these findings suggest the lack of clear evidence to what extent the disciplinary field 
specialization (e.g. basic research vs. teaching) influences the TTOs performance as also other 
factors, more related to the specific TTO, might play a crucial role.  
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[FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE] 
 Consequently, empirical evidence requires careful interpretation when conclusions are 
drawn relying upon aggregated efficiency point estimates both at category and system levels.  In 
this respect, the analysis of confidence intervals might help us draw additional information on the 
precision of our estimates as they indicate how sensitive a particular TTO’s efficiency score is to 
variations in the efficiency of other TTOs in the sample.  Moreover, confidence intervals allow us tp 
easily ascertain not only the precision of each TTO performance but also whether there is any 
empirical evidence to conclude in favour of the null hypothesis that establishes that two TTOs are 
equally efficient (overlapping of the confidence intervals). 
 In our case, several confidence intervals overlaps within each group exclude the presence of 
high degrees of heterogeneity at group level but rather they suggest the presence of possibly 2 or 3 
TTOs sub-categories equally efficient, yet clear intra-group dissimilarities are still present. 
 Thus, summing up, the joint analysis of point and confidence intervals highlights that (i) 
there is a kind of heterogeneity in the performance of French TTOs, (ii) both specific group and 
individual TTO seem to drive the inefficiency, the latter having the highest impact.  
Second stage: assessing the impact of factors affecting TTO efficiency 
 In the second stage of the analysis, we investigate possible determinants of efficiency by 
estimating the econometric model described in equation (4) reported above using the individual 
TTO bias corrected inefficiency score as the dependent variable, and the set of regional 
macroeconomic indicators, regional R&D activity and group-specific characteristics described 
above as independent variables. The parameters are estimated according to algorithm 2 of Simar 
and Wilson (2007), with 2000 bootstrap replications for the bias correction and 2000 bootstrap 
replications for the confidence intervals.  
The estimation results are reported in Table 7. Given that the TTO groups considered in the first 
stage seem to perform differently, we identify them in the regression analysis. In particular, we 
introduce dummies for each group.  
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 The results obtained in our second stage regression support the hypothesis that heterogeneity 
associated to different disciplinary fields impacts the TTOs efficiency.  The impact (positive or 
negative) depends on the groups, as we expected.  In particular, we find that ING and USC have 
some specific features which positively affect their performances while UPAM, UPSM and 
USHS/D-E have specific features which negatively impact the efficiency.  This result confirms the 
classical wisdom about the technology transfer potential of medical sciences and engineering 
compared to other fields of research. It is also in line with findings in Siegel et al. (2008) and 
Caldera and Debande (2010). 
 Turning to the specific TTO characteristics, results reveal that the university TTO age 
appears to have a positive effect on efficiency in technology transfer.  There is a learning process 
which takes place allowing an increased professionalization of the TTO staff members.  This 
finding is in line with Mowery et al. (2001), Siegel et al. (2003) but in contrast with Chapple et al. 
(2005), Siegel et al. (2008) for US and UK TTOs, and partially with Caldera and Debande (2010).   
The university size contributes largely to the TTO efficiency. Measured by the number of 
professors employed at the university, the size indicates the potential transferable knowledge in 
terms of possible patentable results.  This result suggests that universities with more researchers are 
likely to be more active and establish collaborative interactions to facilitate the technology transfer. 
This confirms the results obtained by Caldera and Debande (2010).   Contrary to the previous 
positive effects found above, university-related hospital plays an important role in dampening the 
TTO efficiency. It confirms partially the results of previous studies (e.g. Thursby and Kemp, 2002; 
Chapple et al., 2005), while contrasting with the findings in Siegel et al. (2003) and Siegel et al. 
(2008).  However, in France, this negative effect is ascribed to an excessive “local competition” 
presumably concentrated on the medical school and the university-related hospital.  Both 
institutions, the university and the university-related hospital, are legally independent entities. As a 
consequence, they both try and capture the potential technology transfers from life and medical 
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sciences. Although our measures are partial and only the university side is counted, we are able to 
derive first insights on this aspect. 
 As far as the regional effects are concerned, there is a direct connection between R&D 
activity and TTO efficiency. Both Public and Private R&D Expenditure are found to have a positive 
impact on efficiency, with Private R&D Expenditure having the larger impact. This implies that the 
interaction between private firms and TTOs enhances the performance of the latter. This result is 
partially confirmed by the rate of growth of Private and Public R&D expenditure, as only the 
former seems to have a positive impact.  The interpretation of these results is that the dynamics of 
technology transfer are essentially pulled from the ‘outside’. This is in line with Siegel et al. (2003), 
Chapple et al. (2005), Siegel et al. (2008). On the contrary, while previous papers found the 
economic performance at regional level not to be significant (Siegel et al., 2003, Siegel et al., 
2008), we find that there is a negative relation between the economic performance of the region 
where the TTO is located and the TTO itself. Our results reveal that the R&D dimension of the 
regional economic activities matters particularly when at the macroeconomic level the regional 
general activities are weak. 
 Our results show in fact the coexistence of the two simultaneous effects of the technology 
transfer process: a push effect from the university and a pull effect from the private industrial 
sector, which simultaneously have a positive impact, enhancing the efficiency of French TTO 
technology process.  
 
7 Conclusions 
This is the first attempt to study the efficiency of the technology transfer operated by the French 
university system since the major reforms of the early 2000 This study aims to contribute to the 
literature and the actual debate providing empirical evidence on an original and detailed dataset 
built by the BETA (University of Strasbourg) on French TTOs over the period 2003-2007.  TTOs’ 
performance and relative determinants are deeply investigated in several dimensions ranging from 
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specific to group characteristics, from economic to R&D activity conditions in the region where the 
TTO is located. 
Our analysis is based on a two-stage DEA using bootstrap techniques to provide statistical 
inference on the main drivers of TTOs efficiency.  As an innovation in the field of TTOs 
performance, we carefully account for possible sources of efficiency heterogeneity not only 
between groups but also within groups. 
 In the first stage of the analysis, we find substantial inefficiency across French TTOs and in 
the system as a whole. Moreover, we find that TTO efficiency differs systematically according to 
disciplinary fields.  In particular, results indicate higher technical efficiency on average among ING 
and USC TTOs while USHS/D-E and UPSM rank at the bottom.  The confidence interval analysis 
of the individual TTO efficiency (as innovative methodological approach to this field of literature) 
highlights the presence of “hidden” heterogeneity, this time, within each group of universities.  
While the first form of heterogeneity is more related to the nature of the disciplinary field, the 
“hidden” one might be ascribed to several aspects.  For instance, these results may suggest that 
outputs used in our production models do not cover the full range of TTOs activities.  
Commercialization via patents and licenses is certainly a particular way for public research 
institutions to contribute to the economy. But there are also other ways to collaborate and to transfer 
knowledge. There are formal interactions, such as contract research, public-private partnerships, 
collaborative research, service deliveries, consultancies and informal interaction, such as advice and 
networking, expertise and cultural activities.  However, our analysis focuses on the TTO efficiency 
and mostly on the formal interactions, such as patents related activities, that are usually handled by 
TTOs and represent in many cases a great part of their activity. 
 In the light of first stage results, at the second stage we statistically investigate the link 
between TTO performance and relevant aspects to the technology transfer process operated by 
TTOs.  These are related to specific- and group- characteristics as well as economic conditions of 
the regions where TTOs are located. 
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The analysis confirms that some categories of universities, namely universities in engineering, 
natural science and polyvalent with medical school have some specific features which affect 
positively the performance of their TTOs.  Further, the analysis confirms that multiple affiliations 
such as medical school and a university-related hospital are certainly a source of inefficiency due to 
the excessive competition among locally close TTOs.  Regarding additional specific TTO 
characteristics, we find that seniority of TTOs (particularly when the technology transfer function 
was introduced before 1999) has a positive impact. Moreover, it is also found that the well-
functioning French TTO is driven by two forces: the scale economies related to the university size, 
on the one hand, and the local intensity of industry (and public) R&D on the other.  This implies 
that TTOs could enhance their efficiency when these two forces work simultaneously.  
Further investigations will be directed to including in the analysis more recent years, additional 
outputs to proxy also the informal channels of technology transfer and to take into account the 
influence of outliers in the explanation of inefficiency determinants by applying the recently 
developed nonparametric conditional methodology (Daraio and Simar, 2007; Daraio, Simar and 
Wilson, 2010; Badin, Daraio and Simar, 2011).  
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Tables of the paper 
 
 
Table 1: Selected results from the literature on TTOs efficiency. 
TTOs Number 
of outputs Authors Output used MED AGE INC SCI PUB SIZE 
GROUP9 
 
REG  
GDP 
REG 
R&D  
Number of licences ne ne     ne     ne + One 
output 
Siegel et al. 2003     
Anderson et al. 2007 Licensing Income no +   ne   ne ne 
US 
Multiple 
output 
Thursby and Kemp 
2002 
Number of licenses, patent 
applications, invention 
disclosures, amount of 
royalties and industry 
sponsored research 
-       +10   yes     
Number of licences ne +         ne + UK One 
output Chapple et al. 2005 Licensing Income 
- ne          + ne 
Number of licences ne  ne   ne - +  ne     Spain One ouput Caldera and Debande 2010 Licensing Income ne +   + ne + +     
US & 
UK 
Multiple 
output Siegel et al. 2008 
Number of licenses, income 
from licenses, university 
startups + - + ne       ne + 
Note 1: “ne” stands for no effect, “+ “ for positive effects, “-“ for negative effects, “yes” means that there is an impact and it depends on what we control for. 
Note 2: MED stands for Medical School, AGE for TTO Age, INC for Incubator, SCI for Science Park, PUB for Public University, SIZE for University Size, GROUP for Group Characteristics, REG 
GDP for Regional GDP and REG R&D for Regional R&D. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 This effect is controlled using different approaches.  
10
 In this case, authors test whether (or not) a private university effect the TTO performance. 
 Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by TTOs categories  
 
Class Variable ETP PUB PAT_APP SW_APP PAT_EXT Nb_PAT_EXT 
Mean 6.197 661.105 3.629 1.303 0.810 2.667 
Median 2.500 737.461 3.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
St.Dev. 6.496 398.331 3.734 2.801 1.504 3.851 
Min 0.500 52.741 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 I
N
G
 
 
Max 26.650 1463.830 15.000 15.000 5.000 16.000 
Mean 5.173 783.978 4.083 0.820 1.868 1.974 
Median 4.000 723.696 3.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
St.Dev. 4.709 354.676 3.665 1.385 2.133 2.194 
Min 1.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 U
PA
M
 
 
Max 26.650 1701.007 19.000 6.000 8.000 9.000 
Mean 2.639 357.671 1.474 0.345 0.436 0.718 
Median 2.000 224.847 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
St.Dev. 1.686 319.849 2.458 0.965 1.334 1.555 
Min 0.000 51.567 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 U
PS
M
 
 Max 7.000 1405.848 12.000 6.000 7.000 7.000 
Mean 11.662 2757.143 10.000 1.869 5.714 6.452 
Median 9.700 2511.680 8.000 1.000 4.000 6.500 
St.Dev. 8.670 1779.189 8.118 2.802 5.518 5.388 
Min 2.000 88.733 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
U
SC
 
 Max 39.000 7664.471 40.000 12.000 18.000 18.000 
Mean 3.180 45.779 0.150 0.600 0.083 0.083 
Median 2.000 30.146 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
St.Dev. 2.997 48.016 0.489 0.883 0.289 0.289 
Min 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 U
SH
S/
D
-
E 
 Max 11.000 140.983 2.000 3.000 1.000 1.000 
Source: Authors calculations 
Table 3: Correlation coefficients 
 ETP PUB PAT _APP SW_APP PAT_EXT Nb_PAT_EXT 
ETP 1      
PUB 0.7833 1     
PAT _APP 0.7541 0.8321 1    
SW_APP 0.374 0.2841 0.466 1   
PAT_EXT 0.6258 0.733 0.8787 0.3966 1  
Nb_PAT_EXT 0.6747 0.7479 0.88 0.3709 0.9292 1 
Source: Authors calculations 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics by categories of universities 
 
Class Variable AGE SIZE HOSPITAL 
Mean 11.743 988.171 0.000 
Median 9.000 1072.000 0.000 
St.Dev. 9.160 465.108 0.000 
Min 0.000 436.000 0.000 
IN
G
 
 
Max 28.000 1768.000 0.000 
Mean 7.923 923.692 0.923 
Median 8.000 850.000 1.000 
St.Dev. 3.124 619.429 0.277 
Min 2.000 410.000 0.000 U
PA
M
 
 
Max 14.000 2878.000 1.000 
Mean 4.569 1229.725 0.000 
Median 4.000 922.000 0.000 
St.Dev. 2.727 759.309 0.000 
Min 0.000 102.000 0.000 U
PS
M
 
 Max 11.000 2700.000 0.000 
Mean 15.214 1181.500 0.750 
Median 16.000 1095.000 1.000 
St.Dev. 8.437 640.715 0.500 
Min 0.000 281.000 0.000 
U
SC
 
 Max 37.000 2286.000 1.000 
Mean 4.250 1389.400 0.000 
Median 3.500 1470.000 0.000 
St.Dev. 3.193 489.197 0.000 
Min 0.000 624.000 0.000 US
H
S/
D
-
E 
 Max 11.000 1980.000 0.000 
Sources: Age: Bach and Llerena 2006-2008-2010; Size: Aquameth-PRIME NoE database, 
all other variables: OST, 2008 and 2010. 
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Table 5: Efficiency Estimates by university category, Model 1.  
 
University 
Type 
Efficiency 
Estimate 
(EFF) 
Efficiency 
Estimate 
Bias-corrected 
 (C-EFF) 
Estimated 
bias  
(Est-Bias) 
Estimated 
Std  
(Est-Std) 
Confidence 
Interval: lower 
bound (LB) 
Confidence 
Interval: upper 
bound (UB) 
ING-9 1.099 1.271 -0.172 0.074 1.118 1.408 
ING-30 1.000 1.317 -0.317 0.129 1.037 1.531 
ING-3 1.000 1.325 -0.325 0.130 1.034 1.531 
ING-24 1.224 1.515 -0.291 0.116 1.270 1.719 
ING-35 1.416 1.587 -0.171 0.085 1.442 1.762 
ING-36 1.734 2.104 -0.370 0.157 1.789 2.400 
ING-32 7.036 8.023 -0.987 0.476 7.138 8.975 
Geom. Mean 1.567 1.902     
Std.Dev. 2.204 2.474         
UPAM-14 1.000 1.249 -0.249 0.086 1.036 1.385 
UPAM-23 1.000 1.309 -0.309 0.119 1.031 1.486 
UPAM-31 1.086 1.345 -0.259 0.121 1.122 1.571 
UPAM-22 1.112 1.365 -0.253 0.116 1.145 1.580 
UPAM-21 1.426 1.763 -0.338 0.151 1.478 2.041 
UPAM-50 1.592 1.867 -0.275 0.113 1.633 2.078 
UPAM-55 2.018 2.328 -0.310 0.136 2.069 2.594 
UPAM-18 2.049 2.454 -0.405 0.167 2.121 2.771 
UPAM-2 2.056 2.585 -0.529 0.230 2.115 3.016 
UPAM-41 2.145 2.611 -0.466 0.217 2.199 3.029 
UPAM-7 2.356 2.622 -0.267 0.148 2.378 2.935 
UPAM-71 2.607 2.883 -0.276 0.157 2.637 3.222 
UPAM-59 3.742 4.677 -0.935 0.436 3.875 5.460 
Geom. Mean 1.719 2.078     
Std.Dev. 0.787 0.939         
UPSM-25 1.000 1.280 -0.280 0.121 1.033 1.492 
UPSM-4 1.000 1.384 -0.384 0.172 1.030 1.651 
UPSM-49 1.000 1.444 -0.444 0.235 1.029 1.867 
UPSM-10 1.255 1.579 -0.325 0.155 1.289 1.866 
UPSM-43 1.453 1.700 -0.247 0.107 1.488 1.913 
UPSM-12 1.643 2.044 -0.401 0.156 1.702 2.311 
UPSM-61 2.026 2.248 -0.223 0.119 2.056 2.505 
UPSM-1 2.193 2.615 -0.422 0.219 2.252 3.062 
UPSM-17 2.702 3.346 -0.644 0.292 2.794 3.870 
UPSM-62 4.549 5.721 -1.172 0.515 4.689 6.721 
UPSM-52 5.619 6.461 -0.842 0.386 5.724 7.239 
UPSM-38 6.369 7.662 -1.292 0.498 6.567 8.627 
UPSM-74 8.225 10.737 -2.512 1.428 8.412 13.401 
Geom. Mean 2.292 2.856     
Std.Dev. 2.396 2.998         
       
       
 38 
University 
Type 
Efficiency 
Estimate 
(EFF) 
Efficiency 
Estimate 
Bias-corrected 
 (C-EFF) 
Estimated 
bias  
(Est-Bias) 
Estimated 
Std  
(Est-Std) 
Confidence 
Interval: lower 
bound (LB) 
Confidence 
Interval: upper 
bound (UB) 
USC-68 1.000 1.271 -0.271 0.121 1.033 1.498 
USC-73 1.000 1.320 -0.320 0.126 1.034 1.530 
USC-69 1.000 1.320 -0.320 0.138 1.038 1.563 
USC-34 1.000 1.328 -0.328 0.149 1.028 1.591 
USC-5 1.000 1.349 -0.349 0.143 1.022 1.565 
USC-64 1.000 1.373 -0.373 0.162 1.034 1.626 
USC-51 1.211 1.392 -0.181 0.076 1.250 1.544 
USC-33 1.306 1.543 -0.238 0.101 1.344 1.748 
USC-42 1.627 1.940 -0.313 0.151 1.683 2.235 
USC-26 1.582 1.942 -0.361 0.156 1.636 2.249 
USC-37 1.893 2.300 -0.407 0.183 1.947 2.647 
USC-65 2.490 3.001 -0.512 0.224 2.562 3.437 
USC-54 3.444 4.097 -0.654 0.319 3.538 4.720 
USC-13 3.960 4.645 -0.685 0.284 4.066 5.214 
Geom. Mean 1.488 1.857     
Std.Dev. 0.967 1.101         
USHS/DE-58 1.000 1.442 -0.442 0.233 1.028 1.867 
USHS/DE-48 1.000 1.446 -0.446 0.230 1.039 1.867 
USHS/DE-60 2.044 2.635 -0.592 0.272 2.117 3.138 
USHS/DE-46 7.515 9.469 -1.954 0.838 7.717 11.000 
Geom. Mean 1.980 2.686         
Std.Dev. 3.123 3.855         
Overall      
Geom. Mean 1.775 2.202     
Overall           
Std. Dev. 1.803 2.201         
Source: Authors calculations 
 
Table 5: Efficiency Estimates by category, Model 1 (cont.) 
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Table 6: Efficiency Estimates by category, Model 2. 
 
University 
Type 
Efficiency 
Estimate 
(EFF) 
Efficiency 
Estimate 
Bias-
corrected 
 (C-EFF) 
Estimated 
bias  
(Est-Bias) 
Estimated 
Std  
(Est-Std) 
Confidence 
Interval: 
lower 
bound 
(LB) 
Confidence 
Interval: 
upper 
bound 
(UB) 
ING-30 1.000 1.300 -0.300 0.131 1.026 1.516 
ING-9 1.099 1.340 -0.241 0.115 1.119 1.533 
ING-3 1.000 1.340 -0.340 0.146 1.028 1.557 
ING-36 1.000 1.355 -0.355 0.160 1.025 1.582 
ING-35 1.000 1.395 -0.395 0.208 1.031 1.741 
ING-24 1.224 1.525 -0.302 0.129 1.261 1.755 
ING-32 7.036 8.045 -1.009 0.495 7.146 9.038 
Geom. Mean 1.379 1.769         
Std.Dev. 2.263 2.522         
UPAM-18 1.000 1.256 -0.256 0.129 1.032 1.491 
UPAM-31 1.000 1.269 -0.269 0.118 1.027 1.477 
UPAM-23 1.000 1.342 -0.342 0.152 1.030 1.568 
UPAM-14 1.000 1.352 -0.352 0.156 1.026 1.557 
UPAM-22 1.112 1.383 -0.270 0.123 1.147 1.600 
UPAM-21 1.179 1.480 -0.301 0.136 1.206 1.713 
UPAM-50 1.592 1.938 -0.346 0.173 1.629 2.248 
UPAM-55 2.018 2.337 -0.320 0.144 2.069 2.618 
UPAM-2 2.056 2.572 -0.516 0.234 2.118 3.020 
UPAM-7 2.356 2.610 -0.255 0.148 2.376 2.932 
UPAM-41 2.145 2.668 -0.522 0.246 2.191 3.077 
UPAM-71 2.607 2.944 -0.337 0.182 2.646 3.312 
UPAM-59 2.558 3.151 -0.593 0.265 2.636 3.646 
Geom. Mean 1.547 1.908         
Std.Dev. 0.645 0.711         
UPSM-25 1.000 1.322 -0.322 0.137 1.029 1.525 
UPSM-17 1.000 1.326 -0.326 0.142 1.026 1.546 
UPSM-10 1.062 1.351 -0.289 0.127 1.087 1.571 
UPSM-4 1.000 1.389 -0.389 0.193 1.022 1.687 
UPSM-49 1.000 1.413 -0.413 0.227 1.028 1.858 
UPSM-12 1.143 1.435 -0.291 0.129 1.175 1.656 
UPSM-43 1.438 1.786 -0.348 0.152 1.481 2.059 
UPSM-61 2.026 2.244 -0.219 0.122 2.057 2.524 
UPSM-38 1.841 2.265 -0.424 0.236 1.877 2.723 
UPSM-1 2.193 2.630 -0.437 0.230 2.230 3.093 
UPSM-62 4.549 5.692 -1.143 0.522 4.681 6.717 
UPSM-52 5.619 6.439 -0.819 0.401 5.690 7.205 
UPSM-74 8.225 10.543 -2.318 1.399 8.387 13.413 
Geom. Mean 1.851 2.336     
Std.Dev. 2.263 2.807         
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University 
Type 
Efficiency 
Estimate 
(EFF) 
Efficiency 
Estimate 
Bias-
corrected 
 (C-EFF) 
Estimated 
bias  
(Est-Bias) 
Estimated 
Std  
(Est-Std) 
Confidence 
Interval: 
lower 
bound 
(LB) 
Confidence 
Interval: 
upper 
bound 
(UB) 
USC-68 1.000 1.265 -0.265 0.128 1.029 1.494 
USC-34 1.000 1.316 -0.316 0.152 1.033 1.602 
USC-5 1.000 1.332 -0.332 0.146 1.030 1.560 
USC-69 1.000 1.342 -0.342 0.154 1.028 1.593 
USC-73 1.000 1.347 -0.347 0.161 1.023 1.603 
USC-64 1.000 1.367 -0.367 0.174 1.024 1.630 
USC-51 1.211 1.422 -0.211 0.091 1.251 1.591 
USC-37 1.182 1.463 -0.280 0.141 1.222 1.740 
USC-33 1.305 1.582 -0.277 0.117 1.340 1.803 
USC-42 1.315 1.626 -0.311 0.143 1.355 1.902 
USC-26 1.386 1.721 -0.336 0.143 1.438 1.982 
USC-65 2.490 3.077 -0.588 0.260 2.558 3.533 
USC-54 3.444 4.100 -0.656 0.332 3.542 4.741 
USC-13 3.829 4.603 -0.774 0.310 3.940 5.176 
Geom. Mean 1.437 1.815         
Std.Dev. 0.978 1.138         
USHS/DE-58 1.000 1.400 -0.400 0.223 1.033 1.854 
USHS/DE-48 1.000 1.413 -0.413 0.222 1.037 1.855 
USHS/DE-60 2.044 2.600 -0.557 0.271 2.097 3.110 
USHS/DE-46 2.926 3.697 -0.771 0.407 2.977 4.430 
Geom. Mean 1.564 2.088         
Std.Dev. 0.930 1.101         
Overall      
Geom. Mean 1.553 1.961         
Overall           
Std. Dev. 1.537 1.836         
Table 5: Efficiency Estimates by category, Model 2 (cont.) 
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Table 7: Determinants of (in-) efficiency differentials 
(Truncated, bootstrapped second-stage regression, inefficient score) 
CI-90% CI-95% CI-99% Variables 
Estimates LB UB LB UB LB UB 
Age -0.128* -0.170 -0.078 -0.207 -0.023 -0.330 0.183 
Size -4.843*** -5.370 -4.210 -5.781 -3.888 -7.589 -3.186 
Regional GDP  1.644*** 1.406 1.914 1.173 2.165 0.637 2.745 
Regional Public R&D 
Expenditure -0.437** -0.509 -0.310 -0.612 -0.178 -0.929 0.202 
Regional Private R&D 
Expenditure -2.091** -2.597 -1.668 -2.880 -1.443 -3.885 -0.834 
Growth Rate Regional 
GDP (%) 0.020** 0.016 0.022 0.012 0.026 -0.009 0.036 
Growth Rate Public 
R&D Expenditure (%) 0.041** 0.033 0.046 0.026 0.049 -0.002 0.075 
Growth Rate Private 
R&D Expenditure (%) -0.402*** -0.427 -0.382 -0.444 -0.382 -0.535 -0.365 
H 5.644*** 4.739 6.070 4.427 6.749 3.455 9.072 
ING -0.259*** -0.326 -0.150 -0.407 -0.045 -0.738 0.493 
UPAM 0.684** 0.536 1.094 0.377 1.431 -0.368 2.185 
UPSM 8.233*** 6.792 9.985 6.322 11.019 5.686 13.380 
USC -0.019* -0.025 -0.010 -0.033 0.000 -0.056 0.024 
USHS 13.940*** 11.951 16.114 11.574 17.100 10.616 20.010 
σε
2
 4.939*** 4.802 5.401 4.657 5.760 3.978 6.667 
 
Notes: 
*=statistically significant at 90% 
**= statistically significant at 95% 
***= statistically significant at 99% 
Note: The variables Public and Private expenses in R&D are highly correlated. 
Therefore the model has been estimated using these variables one at time. 
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Figures of the paper 
 
Figure 1: Definition of TT production process of a TTO 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Boxplots of bias-corrected efficiency scores by category.Model 1(left panel) and Model 2 
(right panel) 
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